You raise very good points on the challenges of science as a social enterprise and the fact that scientists' incentives are not, by default, aligned with the social goals officially assigned to this enterprise. How science happens to "work" in spite of these challenges is a fascinating question. I think that the practical institutions and norms in science have emerged (and continue to evolve) as ways to address this problem of incentives: https://lionelpage.substack.com/i/140888694/conclusion-to-this-series-science-as-a-model
Thanks for your kind words. I am, however, just doing my best to reiterate and apply Sander Greenland's work on the insurmountable meta-scientific problem of perspective to some case studies (https://verawil.de/greenland-seminar-april-19-2023/). Altman, as mentioned, is another classic citation. So those good points are not mine.
When you say you "think that the practical institutions and norms in science have emerged (and continue to evolve) as ways to address this problem of incentives: https://lionelpage.substack.com/i/140888694/conclusion-to-this-series-science-as-a-model" - I'm not sure how to use your thoughts there to address the problems this post raises (tho maybe that was not what you meant).
Looking at your list in the linked post, e.g., (1) "free entry of ideas" isn't free when there's political censorship. Think of the Dickey Amendment in the U.S., for instance, which prohibits CDC funding for gun control research (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dickey_Amendment). That's formal; there's also informal limitation of free speech in the scientific discourse, as when dissenting abortion research is subjected to heightened scrutiny and asymmetric penalties on the basis of its policy implications/orientation.
(2) "Controlling conflicts of interest" doesn't necessarily promote the best ideas when transparency/neutrality get distorted into political litmus testing. But maybe you have something to say about the correct operationalization of COI here? Would be especially glad to hear/read ideas on this. My sense was that McIntosh & Vitale were operating way outside the norm in construing COI as more than material, broadening it to explicitly consider political affiliation and policy implications of research (for one side only) -- and implicitly bringing religion in where it does not belong under any modern Western legal or ethical rubric.
(3) "Rewards favoring consensual views" could alternately be construed as the spiral of silence discouraging dissenting and moderate voices in polarized discourses, feeding hyperpolarization.
The theme linking all these problems seems to be the pervasive presence of interpretation in science itself. If we recognize this as inescapable, then the institutions and norms you mention are also problematized by it. "No exit"...
You raise very good points on the challenges of science as a social enterprise and the fact that scientists' incentives are not, by default, aligned with the social goals officially assigned to this enterprise. How science happens to "work" in spite of these challenges is a fascinating question. I think that the practical institutions and norms in science have emerged (and continue to evolve) as ways to address this problem of incentives: https://lionelpage.substack.com/i/140888694/conclusion-to-this-series-science-as-a-model
Thanks for your kind words. I am, however, just doing my best to reiterate and apply Sander Greenland's work on the insurmountable meta-scientific problem of perspective to some case studies (https://verawil.de/greenland-seminar-april-19-2023/). Altman, as mentioned, is another classic citation. So those good points are not mine.
When you say you "think that the practical institutions and norms in science have emerged (and continue to evolve) as ways to address this problem of incentives: https://lionelpage.substack.com/i/140888694/conclusion-to-this-series-science-as-a-model" - I'm not sure how to use your thoughts there to address the problems this post raises (tho maybe that was not what you meant).
Looking at your list in the linked post, e.g., (1) "free entry of ideas" isn't free when there's political censorship. Think of the Dickey Amendment in the U.S., for instance, which prohibits CDC funding for gun control research (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dickey_Amendment). That's formal; there's also informal limitation of free speech in the scientific discourse, as when dissenting abortion research is subjected to heightened scrutiny and asymmetric penalties on the basis of its policy implications/orientation.
(2) "Controlling conflicts of interest" doesn't necessarily promote the best ideas when transparency/neutrality get distorted into political litmus testing. But maybe you have something to say about the correct operationalization of COI here? Would be especially glad to hear/read ideas on this. My sense was that McIntosh & Vitale were operating way outside the norm in construing COI as more than material, broadening it to explicitly consider political affiliation and policy implications of research (for one side only) -- and implicitly bringing religion in where it does not belong under any modern Western legal or ethical rubric.
(3) "Rewards favoring consensual views" could alternately be construed as the spiral of silence discouraging dissenting and moderate voices in polarized discourses, feeding hyperpolarization.
The theme linking all these problems seems to be the pervasive presence of interpretation in science itself. If we recognize this as inescapable, then the institutions and norms you mention are also problematized by it. "No exit"...